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Weekly Report

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C O N T E N T S

	<u>Page</u>
1. Thailand	1
2. Venezuela	2
[Redacted]	
4. Cyprus	4
5. Belgium-Congo	5

25X1

19 December 1966

Approved For Release 2004/07/28 : CIA-RDP79T00826A001500010035-1


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1. THAILAND

The Communists' movement seems still to be in an early stage of development even in their northeast stronghold. Nevertheless, they are apparently scoring modest gains



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northern Thailand is a natural target for subversion because of its rugged terrain, its accessibility to Communist areas in Laos, and the absence of an effective Thai Government presence.

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despite these gains the movement is still weak.

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2. VENEZUELA

The Venezuelan Government has responded vigorously to the Communist terrorist campaign in Caracas.

President Leoni probably averted direct military intervention in the government when on 13 December he acceded to the demands of the military to suspend constitutional guarantees, which permitted military occupation of Central University, long a sacrosanct haven for terrorists. The government has permanently terminated the university's privileged extraterritorial status.

The army had exerted considerable pressure on the government to take strong measures in late November when the campaign reached a stage of increasing violence and almost daily attacks on army and security officials. The military's dissatisfaction over the government's vacillation led to its demand for the suspension of constitutional guarantees when terrorists assassinated a retired major and attempted to murder the army chief of staff on 13 December.

25X1 [redacted] the government's moves, which so far appear to have the support or at least acceptance of the general public. The Communists seem to have been caught off balance and have not yet reacted. The terrorists probably will attempt to continue their campaign, but whether the occupation of the university and the arrest of numerous suspects have effectively disrupted the terrorist organization remains to be seen.

25X1 The military are now in a more favorable position than before to counter Communist terrorism and guerrilla warfare. [redacted]

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4. CYPRUS

President Makarios' penchant for duplicity has once again heated up the Cyprus dispute.

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[redacted] negotiations with Czechoslovakia to obtain arms for an augmented police force independent of the Greek-controlled Cyprus National Guard. When Makarios told Athens [redacted] plans to strengthen his police force, he apparently did not reveal that negotiations for the arms [redacted]

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[redacted] the Greeks quickly attempted to force Makarios to agree to place them under the control of the national guard. Athens announced that a satisfactory arrangement had been made, but it is now clear that the weapons will remain in the custody of the Cyprus police. However, a "gentlemen's agreement" was reached whereby the arms will not be distributed until sometime after February. Makarios has also agreed to permit periodic inspection by the UN peace force commander.

Turkey sent an aide-memoire to Athens and Nicosia protesting Makarios' action and demanding UN control of the arms already delivered. Ankara also insists that no further deliveries be made.

Czechoslovakia has now assured Ankara that it will stop a planned shipment of armored cars. While the Czech arms deal may have been made with Soviet knowledge, there is no evidence of Soviet intention to inflame the Cyprus issue.

Makarios may allow a cooling-off period before proceeding with his objectives. However, it is clear that he is determined to build his own paramilitary force independent of Athens.

The incident again points up Athens' limited leverage in its dealings with Makarios. [redacted]

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5. BELGIUM-CONGO

Belgian relations with the year-old Mobutu government, exceptionally friendly at first, have since deteriorated.

Earlier this year Mobutu moved to reopen the twice-negotiated settlement of the Congo's legacy of debts and assets from its colonial past. In Brussels, irritation with Mobutu, a desire for economy, and the departure from the cabinet of Foreign Minister Spaak, architect of Belgium's Congo policy, led to a reduction in Belgian military assistance personnel. The Belgian aid program was also reduced, resulting in a ten-percent cut in the number of teachers and technicians and the elimination of Belgium's allocation of \$2 million toward the Congolese-US-Belgian fund for the purchase of military supplies for the Congo.

In recent months, however, the Union Miniere, which has long symbolized Belgian business domination of the Congo, began negotiations with the Mobutu regime, which was looking toward a greater Congolese voice in the company. The apparent success of the negotiations last month coincided with the Belgian aid coordinator's optimistic assessment that he had blunted the Belgian drive for disengagement.

Nevertheless, Belgian-Congolese relations again seem headed for trouble. Mobutu has abruptly broken off negotiations with the Belgian mining concern and is now insisting that it transfer administration of all its assets--both African and European--from Brussels to Kinshasa by 1 January.

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Mobutu has backed off from confrontations with the Belgians before, however, and may do so again this time.

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